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Preface 
 
 Europe has always had an interesting relationship with Russia, be it social, political, or economic. 
From the days of the Cold War, when there was the ideological battle of communism versus capitalism, 
with the alliance of NATO representing a front against the Iron Curtain, certain remnants of this dynamic 
have still survived. Russia has not always had the best of relations with the European Union (EU), which 
has not made it easy for the EU to have fully functioning foreign relations with them. This is problematic 
specifically because of the importance that Russia has on EU energy security, as it is the largest supplier 
of both gas and oil to the EU. Gas in particular is a difficult issue, as Russia controls a vast amount of 
pipelines going to Europe that not just carry Russian gas, but also Caspian gas to the EU gas supply 
market. This created the situation that Russia has become empowered with one of the key elements that 
the EU requires for economic growth – natural energy resources. 
 The 2014 Ukraine Crisis was a reminder to the EU of this power that Russia holds, after Russia 
increased gas prices to Ukraine by more than 40%. While Ukraine is not part of the EU it did present an 
energy security threat. For the past decade the EU has been implementing new energy policies that are 
primarily directed towards energy security and energy diversification – of both the source of energy as 
well as the type of energy. Efforts at executing this policy have been made, and new hydrocarbon 
discoveries in the EU’s neighboring regions of the Caspian and the Levant Basin are helping to provide 
alternatives to a Russian dominated gas supply market. Given the tensions that are being felt across 
Europe right now with the Russian annexation of Crimea, there could not be a better time for the EU to 
turn towards its allies and neighbors in hope of an increased energy security in the future. 
 The objective of this work is to not only create an account of the historical developments which 
led to the current situation, but also provide coherent analysis aimed at guiding future policy 
development. This is not a finished work and I intend to parallel my analysis with the development of EU 
energy policy in the future. 
 
Geneva, Switzerland       G A B R I E L  A L F R E D O  U R I B E  
May 6, 2014  
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Abstract 
 
This paper is divided into various sections in order to provide a comprehensive understanding of the 
current state as well as the future of the EU’s energy policy. The main section is the analytical section, 
which is divided into four sub-sections. The first sub-section offers an understanding of the background to 
the EU energy policy, as well as the current context under which it is being analyzed. This sub-section is 
also accompanied by key definitions and figures in this topic. The following sub-section will look at the 
different relevant actors in the topic of EU energy security. Not only will it analyze the EU itself, but it 
will also analyze both geostrategic and geopolitical partners of the EU from various global regions. Sub-
section 4.3 will focus entirely on the technical and political capabilities of future potential regional energy 
partners of the EU. It will offer an in-depth understanding of three regions with which the EU will most 
likely end up developing strong strategic energy partnerships. This sub-section will also identify why 
Turkey will end up playing a crucial part in the future of the EU’s energy security policy to take on the 
role of a ‘gatekeeper’ to the EU’s energy demand market. 
 The last sub-section, 4.4, lays out short, medium, and long-term plans that the EU’s energy policy 
will most likely take on, based on the analysis contained in this paper. While it is a speculative section of 
the paper it uses reasonable deduction of the past EU energy policies and current geopolitical 
relationships that the EU has with various regions and allies to create likely scenarios. These scenarios 
will have been compiled from both the quantitative and qualitative primary and secondary research that 
was conducted in order to obtain a comprehensive multifaceted overview of the EU energy policy. 
 This paper’s ultimate goal is to be able to provide an understanding of the future energy 
relationships that the EU will have as a result of the east-west energy corridor that is being built in order 
for the EU to have access to the Middle East, Persian Gulf, Levant Basin, and Caspian energy regions. 
The energy relationships that will be forged with these regions are going to be the driving force behind a 
reduction of the overwhelming current dependence on Russian gas.  
  Uribe, Gabriel 
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1. Introduction  
It is often said that as long as the light stays on, the world keeps spinning; that the root of human 
development in the 20th and 21st Century has been the exploitation of available energy resources to us. 
Without it, we would not have been able to advance as a society. It is this often forgotten truth, the root of 
development, which has made us both stronger and weaker – as a result of our heavy reliance on it, and 
the countries which supply these natural energy sources. To be a country that is energy independent is a 
luxury that few have, and to be controlling energy flows is a privilege reserved for only a handful of 
those. Not only does the control of natural energy resources give a country an upper hand in international 
relations, but being able to control both one’s enemies and friends’ energy supply gives a government 
political power far beyond its borders. Few natural energy resources, with the exception of oil, have 
proven this to be true than natural gas. This reliance on other’s natural resources to provide the required 
energy has left countries and their governments exposed to a lack of control over what could be argued is 
one of the most vital infrastructures for any modern state. This phenomenon in international relations has 
lead to energy security policies taking an increasingly important role in governments’ both domestic and 
foreign policies. One can observe this trend in international relations occurring due to the topic of energy 
supply security having become more important for international system dynamics after economic factors 
became equally important to political and military factors in the 21st century security perceptions.1 
 Energy security, which can be defined as “the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an 
affordable price”2,3 is a phenomenon that began to appear much more predominantly as part of a country’s 
security policy in the 1970s after the Middle East Oil Crisis, in which the world realized the heavy 
reliance that had been placed on natural energy resources for the development of world economies.4 After 
this crisis, which also brought about it the creation of the International Energy Agency (IEA), it has 
                                                
1 Gokhan Ozkan, “The Nabucco Project Within the Context of Energy Supply Security and International Politics,” China-USA Business 
Review 10, no. 8 (2011): 689. 
2 International Energy Agency, “Energy Security,” accessed April 24, 2014, http://www.iea.org/topics/energysecurity/  
3 This is the definition of “energy security” that will be referred to in this paper when the topic is discussed. 
4 Escribano Frances Gonzalo, "Market Or Geopolitics? the Europeanization of EU's Energy Corridors," International Journal of Energy 
Sector Management 5, no. 1 (2011): 40, Accessed April 9, 2014, http://search.proquest.com/docview/864099162?accountid=11243 . 
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become common for nations to tie energy policy to security policy, as Dr. Furfari, an expert on energy 
geopolitics at the Free University of Brussels, put it.5 With this also came about the concept of “energy 
diversification”6, which became an important foreign policy strategy for nations to be able to avoid the 
trap of falling under the monopoly or oligopoly of a single or few foreign entities that had control over 
natural energy resources. By actively pursuing a policy of energy diversification, governments would be 
able to ensure stable economic and physical development of the country due to a constant flow of the 
needed energy resources. While energy security and energy diversification are two policies that are 
increasingly pursued in most countries they are not always successfully executed due to the geopolitics 
which have in turn caused tensions to arise in various global regions. 
In few regions of the world is this as perfectly exemplified as in Europe. Europe, being a highly 
developed economic region, with the European Union (EU) economic zone having the second highest 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the world after the US, is the second biggest natural gas7 consuming 
region of the world. As a region, the EU currently consumes roughly 520 billion cubic meters (bcm) of 
gas per year.8 The continent would essentially not be able to operate in an economic capacity if its gas 
supplies were to be cut off. As economic development is so closely tied to a nations political strength, an 
economic collapse could potentially also lead to national crises. When it comes to Europe’s energy 
security, Europe continues to be in a very difficult situation, due to its declining native natural energy 
resource production. This has meant that it has had to rely heavily on its neighbors, especially Russia, for 
its supply of both oil and gas, creating a volatile energy security situation for Europe, and the EU in 
particular. Despite the diversity in the energy mix among its member states, the EU has a heavy reliance 
                                                
5 Dr. Samuele Furfari, Professor on Geopolitics of Energy, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Interview by Gabriel Uribe, 10 April 2014, 
European Commission, Department of Energy, Brussels, Belgium. 
6 While no single definition of “energy diversification” exists, for the purposes of this paper it shall be defined as “a nation using multiple 
sources of energy to run its economy and public services, eliminating dependence on any one source or type of energy. Such diversification 
can mean both renewable and non-renewable energy sources as well as multiple carriers, operators, suppliers, and sources of origin of the 
natural energy resource.”   
7 Natural gas is to be referred to as “gas” from here on forth. 
8 See figure 4.1.2.1 (p.19). 
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on external supplies of energy – it has to import slightly more than 50% of its gas consumption9 - 
requiring the EU to maintain strong diplomatic and political ties with its energy suppliers to ensure a 
continuous flow of gas. However, Europe’s rocky relationship with Russia in the last few decades has led 
to several accounts of Russia temporarily cutting off its gas supply to certain European countries, most 
recently in 2009 to Ukraine10. This posed a threat to the EU’s energy security, which led to the push for a 
diversification of energy suppliers to Europe in an effort to diminish the heavy reliance that the EU had 
on Russian gas. Recent events in Ukraine in early 2014 only served to remind the threat that Russia cold 
pose to Europe’s economic stability, which has pushed EU policy makers to search for alternatives to 
Russian gas. 
 The purpose of this paper will therefore be to analyze the state of the EU’s energy security and the 
options that it has in order to diversify its energy suppliers as well as the types of energies it consumes. 
This paper will analyze this topic from a geopolitical context in order to be able to evaluate the 
implications that the EU’s decision to attain its gas from an additional source will have. It will therefore 
assess the suitability of various potential energy partners for the EU and will then consider likely future 
scenarios for the EU energy policy based on those findings. The geopolitical energy chessboard of Europe 
will thus be examined in order to find an advantageous solution to the long-existing dilemma of Russian 
gas dominance in the EU market, as well as the feasibility of reducing Russian influence on European 
energy needs in the long run. 
 
 
 
2. Literature Review  
                                                
9 Jorg Doerler, Kurt Oswald, and Akshat Seth, “The Future of the European Gas Supply,” A.T. Kearny, December, 2011, accessed April 9, 
2014, http://www.atkearney.com/paper/-/asset_publisher/dVxv4Hz2h8bS/content/the-future-of-the-european-gas-supply/10192 . 
10 Koji Fujishima, “European Strategies on Gas Supply Security,” The Institute of Energy Economics, Japan, (2009) 
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The issue of security policy in the EU is one that has its origins in the 1970s, and thus several 
relevant academic research papers exist in the topic, many of which analyze the issue from a theoretical 
perspective, although some also tackle the issue from the perspective of future potential solutions. Besides 
academic papers, many think tanks, such as A.T. Kearney, the Institut für Europäische Politik, and the 
Observatoire Méditerranéen de l’Energie, conduct reviews of the current quantitative state of energy 
supplies to the EU market. There is therefore a significant amount of quantitative and qualitative research 
in the topic of EU energy security. One of the most relevant ones that will be referred to in this paper is 
“Long-term natural gas supply to Europe: Import potential, infrastructure needs and investment 
promotion” by Manfred Hafner et al., as it gives a very thorough background of the current gas supply 
and demand situation in the EU, while also providing a breakdown of each future potential gas supplier to 
the EU. It thus helps to create a solid understanding of future geopolitical implications of potential EU 
energy partnerships with those suppliers. However, it does not thoroughly discuss the EU energy policy or 
EU energy security policy.  
 This is where the academic paper “The Nabucco Project Within the Context of Energy Supply 
Security and International Politics” by Gokhan Ozkan from the China-USA Business Review comes in, as 
it does address the issue of EU energy policy and the implications of future partnerships with different 
suppliers and regions. Furthermore, this paper discusses the importance that the east-west energy corridor 
will play in the future of EU gas supply.  
 To complement this paper from more of a quantitative perspective, “Europe’s Energy Future: 
Natural Gas Supply between Geopolitics and the Markets” by Manuel Mohr was widely referred to due to 
its in depth analysis of not just natural gas supply, but also of its demand in the EU from a energy policy 
perspective. It therefore also helped to solidify the theory that while there is high demand for gas in the 
EU at the moment, in the long-run this demand will most likely drop due to the EU’s energy policy of 
reducing dependence on fossil fuels in the future. 
  Uribe, Gabriel 
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 While none of the referred to academic papers compete in the different schools of thought applied, 
they all see the issue of EU energy security as a vital one that is primarily a security policy issue and then 
an economic issue. Where this paper aims to fill the gap in academic research is by tying the issue of EU 
energy security to the contemporary issue of the 2014 Ukraine Crisis and the subsequent annexation of 
Crimea by Russia. It therefore aims to analyze the problem from the perspective of EU energy security in 
the 21st century being rooted in a desire to diminish dependence on Russian gas while creating an outlook 
on future energy partnerships between the EU and its neighbors. 
 
3. Research Methodology  
As this paper aims to address a policy question and the geopolitical strategies and implications that 
lie behind it, the analysis will rely on both qualitative and quantitative data. The qualitative data will be 
used in order to assess the current gas supply and demand market in the EU as well as to be able to project 
where demand and supply will lie in the future. This type of data will be attained from secondary sources 
and will aid in creating an assessment of the energy supply at the moment, and to be able to determine the 
impact that this will have on energy security. 
 In order to have an understanding of the policies in place by the EU with regard to energy security, 
qualitative data will be used. This will be attained from the EU itself, as well as from the energy 
department of the European Commission (EC). In addition, various academic papers from foreign policy 
and security policy journals will be used to have a comprehensive overview of these policies. By 
combining the qualitative and quantitative data with the geopolitical implications that the various actors in 
this topic have, confident predictions can be made about the future of the EU gas supply vis-à-vis to 
energy security. 
 Lastly, a further crucial component of this research paper is the interviews that were conducted in 
order to also understand the perspective of policy experts and academics in this topic. 6 experts were 
interviewed with each interview lasting roughly one hour. Interviews were conducted in both Geneva, 
  Uribe, Gabriel 
 
 17 
Switzerland, as well as in Brussels, Belgium. Interviewees worked for academic think tanks, universities, 
as well as for international organizations. This meant that a wide variety of sources, perspectives, and 
opinions were consulted in order to make this research paper possible. 
 
4. Analysis  
 
4.1 Background and current gas demand/supply figures, as well as future projections 
 
4.1.1 Background 
On March 21st 2014, Russian president Vladimir Putin signed a law that formalized Russia’s annexation 
of Crimea from Ukraine. This will have been one of the most significant moments of the Ukrainian Crisis 
of 2014, yet behind this crisis loomed a much bigger and problematic one for Europe and the EU – a crisis 
which the EU has been facing for years. Through the annexation of Crimea, Russia once again flexed its 
muscles and demonstrated the threat that it could become to Europe. Since the start of the Russian-
European energy partnership, Ukraine had always been an important pawn in the European energy chess 
game due to its geographical location separating Russia from the EU, meaning that a lot of the Russian 
gas supply pipelines to the EU markets had to pass through Ukraine. An unstable Ukraine would therefore 
be a serious threat to Europe’s security policy as it could imply disruptions in Russian gas deliveries to 
Europe. While Russia is not the sole gas supplier to the EU, it is the most significant, as 33% of the gas 
that the EU imports, comes from Russia.11 This has made many EU policy makers uneasy due to the 
strong influence that Russia has had, and continues to have, on EU economic development. In her article, 
German makes this clear by making the connection that energy security affects state security so that cuts 
of energy supply can impact economic dynamics quite seriously.12 
                                                
11 see figure 4.1.2.2  
12 Tracey German, “Pipeline Politics: Georgia and Energy Security.” Small Wars & Insurgencies 20, no. 2 (2009). 
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This is an issue which the European Commission (EC) – the executive body of the EU – has been 
aware of for several years now, and it has led them to create the “Energy Security and Solidarity Action 
Plan”, which was reviewed for the second time in 2008.13 It states, “Europe can and must diminish its 
vulnerability to energy supply shocks, first and foremost by developing its own strengths, internally and 
externally.”14 As can be expected from the EU this means a deeper emphasis on European energy 
interdependence by introducing several mechanism which allow the members to be able to support 
themselves in the case of supply shocks, as well as calling for a much more responsible use of the EU’s 
native natural resource supplies in order to be able to prolong their lifespan. The strategy is five-pronged, 
however it has three main parts to it, which are i) diversification of energy supplies, ii) external energy 
relations, and iii) oil and gas stocks and crisis response mechanisms.15 This increasingly present policy of 
the EU, which is being pursued on a supra-national level, will see the emergence of new players in the 
great European energy game, for many of which this will alter their status on the global stage. The US, 
being a key ally of the EU, also has an interest in the development of the EU energy policy as it is 
imperative to the US’s status of being a global superpower to also have an influence in the future 
direction of EU energy policy.16 However, as Dr. Furfari put it, immediate change in the EU’s energy 
policy will not come easily or quickly as “space, time, and capital are needed to develop the energy 
policy.”17 
The energy crisis that Ukraine faced in 2009, when Russia cut off its gas supply for two weeks, 
only served to remind the EU of the potential threat that Russia poses. This is why the EU, in order to 
have a more stable energy security, must diversify its portfolio not only to different sources of energy, but 
also to different types of energy. Crucially, it must also reduce the percentage of total energy that it attains 
from one region in order to prevent an oligopoly from forming around the EU energy supply market. New 
                                                
13 European Commission, “EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan: 2nd Strategic Energy Review,” EU Press Release Database, 
November 13, 2008. Accessed April 25, 2014, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-08-703_en.htm?locale=en . 
14 ibid. 
15 ibid. 
16 Ozkan, Nabucco Project Within the Context of Energy Supply Security, 693. 
17 Op. cit., Dr. Samuele Furfari 
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discoveries of hydrocarbon reserves in the Levant Basin, as well as the development of several new gas 
pipeline routes through Europe from Central Asia, the Balkans, and the Caucasus have presented plenty of 
new options for the EU to be able to diversify its energy supply portfolio. However, where the EU will 
turn to for its energy needs will have a deep impact on those regions, and thus the geopolitical 
implications need to be understood in order to realize where the EU will be heading in the future with its 
energy policy.   
 
4.1.2 Current gas demand/supply figures for Europe, as well as future projections 
 
In order to be able to understand why the EU needs to diversify its energy supply portfolio, one has to 
look at the current state of the European energy supply market. While indigenous production of energy in 
the EU roughly accounts for 45% of energy that is consumed,18 this number is projected to keep declining 
                                                
18 Op. cit., European Commission, 2008. 
Figure 4.1.2.1 – Current and future gas production 
and supply for EU. (© A.T. Kearney, 2011) 
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in the future. A.T. Kearney, in their report on the future of the European gas supply, indicate that this 
number could potential drop down to anywhere between 15%-20% given the rise in gas demand that can 
be expected in the EU.19,20 This would mean that the EU would have to further rely on its imports from 
Russia, Norway, and Algeria, who combined provide roughly 75% of all of the EU’s natural gas 
imports.21,22  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the EU, natural gas accounts for 24% of gross inland consumption, making it the second most used 
source of energy after oil (which accounts for 34% of gross inland consumption).23,24 Although it only 
accounts for 25% of gross inland consumption, about a third of the gas that is consumed is used for power 
generation, making it a vital part of the electricity infrastructure of the EU.25  
                                                
19 Op. cit., Doerler et al., A.T. Kearney, 2011. 
20 See figure 4.1.2.1 
21 European Commission. “EU-27 Imports of Natural Gas – Percentage of Extra-EU Imports by country of origin, 2011.” Eurostat. June 4, 
2012. Accessed April 29, 2014. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php?title=File:EU-27_imports_of_natural_gas_-
_percentage_of_extra-EU_imports_by_country_of_origin,_2011.png&filetimestamp=20120604085013 . 
22 See figure 4.1.2.2 
23 European Commission. “EU Energy in Figures: Statistical Pocketbook 2013.” 2013. Accessed April 29, 2014. 
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/publications/doc/2013_pocketbook.pdf . 
24 See figure 4.1.2.3 
25 Op. cit., European Commission, 2013. 
Figure 4.1.2.2 – EU natural gas imports by country of origin. (© 
Eurostat, 2012) 
  Uribe, Gabriel 
 
 21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In order to be able to put the challenge that the EU is facing in the future into perspective, one can look at 
the projections that the Mediterranean Energy Observatory (OME) has made for EU gas demand up to 
2030, which indicates import requirements of between 470 and 650 bcm of gas within 20 years.26,27  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although Russia would theoretically be able to keep up with Europe’s demand, according to the Institut 
für Europäische Politik’s forecasts, it would seem unlikely that Russia would keep up its share of the 
                                                
26 Manfred Hafner et al., “Long-Term Natural Gas Supply to Europe: Import Potential, Infrastructure Needs and Investment Promotion,” 
Energy and Environment 19, no. 8 (2008): 1131-1153, accessed April 12, 2014, DOI:10.1260/095830508786939839. 
27 See figure 4.1.2.4 
Figure 4.1.2.3 – EU energy mix, 2011. (©European 
Commission, 2013) 
Figure 4.1.2.4 – Future gas import requirements 
for EU. (© OME, 2008) 
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European natural gas supply market in the future due to the massive demands in natural gas that are 
forecast for the Asian market, creating competition to the European demand market for the destination of 
that Russian gas.28,29  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This therefore leads to the conclusion that if the EU is to wean itself off of a mostly Russian dominated 
European gas supply market, in which some countries rely up to 100% on Russian gas, it must diversify 
its portfolio to regions that have either already made large hydrocarbon reserve discoveries, or to those 
that have the infrastructure in place for the extraction of gas. 
 
4.2 Relevant actors and their interests  
 
The following section will analyze the main actors concerned with the future of the EU’s energy policy, 
either because they will influence, or because they will contribute to the gas supply market. It will look at 
each actor on a case-by-case basis in order to determine the motivations of that actor as well as what role 
it will play in the future of the EU’s energy policy, in addition to how vital the actor will be in the grand 
scheme of it. 
                                                
28 Op. cit., Mohr, 2009. 
29 See figure 4.1.2.5 
Figure 4.1.2.5 – Projections of future Russian 
natural gas production. (©OME, 2008) 
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4.2.1 – The European Union  
The European Commission, which is the executive arm of the EU, is the body that proposed and created 
mechanisms for the implementation of the multi-lateral energy policy, which is nowadays very focused on 
energy security. However, the EU cannot unilaterally implement or define it without any external 
influence from some key actors. Two key actors in the future of the EU’s energy policy will remain to be 
both the US and Russia, due to the influence in the policy that they already portray nowadays. Although 
one of the main reasons for the revised energy policy is to reduce Russian influence on EU energy 
security, the EU will most likely never be able to completely rid itself of this influence which Russia 
exercises due to the existence of the gas pipeline infrastructure creating massive lost economic 
opportunities for both the EU and Russia if they were to abandon this mutually vital partnership. For the 
US it is important to maintain an influence in global energy markets, as a result of the influence which 
they have on global markets and thus also the global balance of power.30 It therefore follows that the US 
would also have high interest in the development of the second biggest energy market of the world, which 
is also the one of one of its closest allies. 
 If the EU is to expand its gas supplier portfolio through a diversification process, it must look for 
regions where it can avoid some of the issues it has had with the Russian supply of gas. Since three 
Eastern European EU member states are ex-Soviet states, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, Russia still has 
influence over them, which makes it unsurprising that all three rely 100% on Russian gas, as can be seen 
in figure 4.2.1.31 This has created a relationship in which the supplier has a control over the consuming 
countries’ energy which indirectly gives the supplier control over the others’ economy. This is a very 
dangerous relationship for the EU and thus part of its energy security policy is to diversify to other energy 
partners in the future that would not have this ability. Furthermore the level of instability of the countries 
                                                
30 Op. cit., Ozkan, 2011, 696. 
31 Clingendael International Energy Programme. “Russian Gas Imports to Europe and Security of Supply – Factsheet.” 2013. Accessed April 
29, 2014. http://www.clingendaelenergy.com/files.cfm?event=files.download&ui=9C1DEEC1-5254-00CF-FD03186604989704 . 
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through which gas pipelines pass through to connect the source of the gas to its destination must be 
minimized as much as possible to ensure that there are no interruptions in the supply of gas. This is 
something which the EU has had to learn due to the sometimes politically volatile nature of some of the 
countries through which pipelines carrying Russian gas have to cross. A perfect example would be the 
Ukrainian Crisis of 2014 posing a constant threat to European gas deliveries due to the high number of 
pipelines connecting Russian gas to EU countries, which pass through Ukraine. There are therefore 
several geopolitical factors which the EU has to consider in order to be able to determine that an 
additional gas supplier is not only economically and structurally viable, but that it also contributes to EU 
energy security efforts. Essentially, the EU does not act alone when it comes to its energy policy and 
ultimately for it to be an effective and comprehensive one, that also emphasizes energy security and 
energy diversification, it must act on a multi-lateral level with both the East and the West. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2.2 – Russia 
Not only has Russia gained massive economic benefits by being Europe’s biggest gas supplier, but it has 
also gained vast amounts of foreign influence too. Therefore, it would not be in Russia’s interests to lose 
this influence, meaning that it would have to find alternative ways to continue to indirectly maintain it 
Figure 4.2.1 – Russian gas imports in EU member 
states by country. (©CIEP, 2013) 
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over the EU’s gas supply. However, while it may seem like Russia has the upper hand when it comes to 
the Russian-EU energy partnership, several key experts on EU security policy point out that it is actually 
the other way around. Dr. Biscop, a leading EU security policy expert from the Egmont Institute in 
Brussels, argues, “without Europe as a customer, the Russian economy would collapse”32 while also 
noting that both parties would lose if there were any lengthy gas interruptions. However, they would lose 
to different extents. Since Europe is Russia’s most important customer, a large portion of its economy 
relies on this relationship, which is also complemented by heavy Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from 
the EU in its infrastructure, meaning that any interruption into this economic flow for even a month would 
cause a significant crisis for Russia.33 Meanwhile, due to the EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action 
Plan, the EU is establishing enough gas stocks to be able to serve Europe for 2 months without gas 
imports in the case of a supply crisis.34 This has therefore established an unspoken relationship of “Russia 
needs Europe more than Europe needs Russia.”35 In order for Russia to therefore continue its influence it 
must go beyond its geopolitical implications with regard to EU gas supply and use the state-owned gas 
giant Gazprom to influence this market. It has been able to successfully do so when one looks at 
alternative gas supply regions for Europe. While Russia’s geostrategic proximity helped it secure a close 
relationship to the EU’s energy market, this has not been an advantage to it in the last few years. What can 
be observed therefore is the combination of its geostrategic location and the might of Gazprom to 
influence the energy rich neighbors it has to its south and to its east, mainly the Balkans, Caucuses and the 
Caspian region, which are three regions where there is EU interest in the potential for them to become 
suppliers to the EU gas market.36 By becoming involved in several gas pipeline projects as well as 
establishing long-term partnership deals with these regions’ hydrocarbon reserves, Russia is ensuring 
                                                
32 Dr. Sven Biscop, Director of “Europe in the World” department, Egmont Institute – Royal Institute for International Relations, Interview 
by Gabriel Uribe. April 11, 2014, Egmont Institute Offices. Brussels, Belgium. 
 
33 Dr. Philippe Copinschi, Professor and expert on EU energy security, Sciences Po Université, Paris, Interview by Gabriel Uribe, April 11, 
2014, Café in Brussels, Brussels, Belgium.   
34 Op. cit., European Commission, 2008. 
35 Op. cit., Copinschi, 2014. 
36 Op. cit., European Commission, 2008. 
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continued indirect as well as direct influence on the EU gas market to prolong its status as an energy 
superpower.37 
 
4.2.3 – Cyprus  
Cyprus is a very interesting case and considered by some a blessing to the EU energy situation due to the 
recent hydrocarbon reserves that have been discovered in its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The 
massive Aphrodite field that was discovered in 2011 contains an estimated 7 tcf of gas in an EU-member 
country, making it the second largest discovered gas field in the EU.38 This discovery, which is one of the 
many discoveries found in the Levant Basin in the last 15 years,39 (see table 4.2.3.1) will help to 
contribute towards the EU’s efforts of energy interdependence. Cyprus sees the gas as elevating it 
financially, especially after the euro crisis, as well as making it a key player on both the international 
stage and the energy supply market. This discovery will therefore also most likely elevate Cyprus’s status 
within the EU. However, historical tensions between Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey stand in the way of the 
development of the gas fields due to the division of the Island between Cyprus and the self-declared 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (which is only recognized by Turkey), this has meant that they have 
had to navigate a very delicate diplomatic path in recent months when addressing the development of gas 
fields. This is because of claims made by Turkey that the discoveries found by Cyprus also belong to its 
northern counterpart, which can unfortunately not be verified as no Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 
boundaries exist between the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and Cyprus due to lack of 
international recognition for the northern part of Cyprus. What would have to follow in the next few years 
for this region to become an addition to the EU gas supplier portfolio would be a rapid development of the 
field as well as a strategy for a method of extraction and transportation of the gas. However, there are 
                                                
37 Op. cit., Ozkan, 2011, 692-693 
38 US Energy Information Administration (US EIA), “Overview of oil and natural gas in the Eastern Mediterranean region,” August 2013, 
Retrieved on Feb. 19, 2014 from http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/Eastern_Mediterranean/eastern-mediterranean.pdf 
39 Ibid. 
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disputes over whether pipelines through Turkey or Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) are better methods of 
extraction, in addition to diplomatic tensions playing part in this decision.40 
 
4.2.4 – Israel  
Israel, like Cyprus, has been blessed with massive hydrocarbon reserves that have been discovered in the 
last 15 years.41,42 In Israel there have so far been a confirmed 33 tcf of gas discovered, which at Israel’s 
current consumption levels43 is enough to last them more than 200 years.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For Israel, the discoveries can be see as a segue to (i) energy independence, (ii) national economic 
prosperity, and (iii) to further establish national security.44 Israel, who will be ready to export gas in 2017, 
therefore has the very viable potential of becoming an additional gas supplier to the EU. It has the benefit 
of its proximity to the EU as a direct neighbor as well as the potential partnership of Israel and Cyprus in 
                                                
40 Natural Gas Europe, April 22, 2014. 
41 See figure 4.2.4.1 
42 Op. cit., US EIA, 2013. 
43 Roughly 350 million cubic feet (Mcf) per day (Energy Tribune, 2011) 
44 Nikolas Panayiotides, “The new geopolitics of the natural gas in the Levant.” Palestine - Israel  Journal of Politics, Economics, and 
Culture 19, no. 1 (2013), retrieved on Feb. 20, 2014 from http://search.proquest.com.proxygw.wrlc.org/docview/1445258879 . 
 
Figure 4.2.4.1 – Recent gas field discoveries in the 
Levant Basin. (© US EIA, 2013) 
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cooperating to export their gas to the EU market.  Geopolitically, Israel would be a wise choice due to an 
existing fruitful relationship between Israel and the EU, as well as Israel not posing the threat of 
monopolizing certain European countries’ gas markets, as is the case with Russia. However, the EU 
would also have to consider the existing relationship that Israel has with Russia, which can be considered 
very amicable. Gazprom, in its efforts to be involved in other regional gas markets, secured the exclusive 
rights to export and develop all LNG discovered in Israel’s Tamar field.45 Therefore an EU energy 
diversification strategy including Israel, while having potential, would not be free from Russian influence. 
 
4.2.5 – United States  
The US has an interesting role in the EU energy policy as it plays a role from the perspective of a global 
superpower instead of that from a current or future potential energy supplier. It has an interest in 
diminishing Russia’s dominance over the European energy supply market as it sees Russia as being a 
                                                
45 Keith Johnson, “Putin’s Mediterranean Move” Foreign Policy Magazine, 27 December 2013, retrieved on February. 28, 2014 from 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/12/27/putin_s_mediterranean_move  
 
Figure 4.2.4.2 – Map of discovered hydrocarbon reserves in the 
Eastern Mediterranean (© IISS, 2013) 
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rival global power, even in the post-Cold War era.46 Due to the US’s close economic relationship with the 
EU, it must also ensure that the EU has a strong energy security due to the links between its energy 
security and its economic prosperity. The support that the US has offered to the EU in the past can be seen 
in that the EU’s regional energy policies depend on constituting an energy export infrastructure that 
bypasses Russia with the support of the US.47 However, the US is also eager to get involved in the EU 
energy supply market due to the boom it has seen in domestic shale gas production. By getting involved 
in the EU energy supply market through gas exports, the US would extend the already existing energy 
partnership that exists nowadays due to US exports of coal to the EU. The extensions of this relationship 
was a point that US Secretary of State John Kerry was eager to make amid fears of a Russian gas cut-off 
to Europe, when he stated that the US would supply the EU with all the gas it needed in order to move 
away from an over-reliance on Russian gas.48 Although this is not theoretically possible for another 20 
years, the statements that he made reaffirmed the strong relationship between the two allies and the US 
commitment to “help Europe find alternative sources of energy beyond Moscow's control.”49 It can 
therefore be expected that the US will have a continued influence in EU energy policy agenda setting in 
the future. 
 
4.2.6 – Turkey  
Turkey has an interesting role in the future of the EU’s energy policy, as it will not be so much of an 
energy supplier, as being a vital part of the future of EU energy security. This is due to its geostrategic 
location, as most future new gas suppliers to the EU will have their gas pass through Turkey to reach the 
EU demand market. As indicated in the EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan there is an interest 
in the development of the Southern Gas Corridor in order to create access to gas supplies from the Middle 
                                                
46 Op. cit., Ozkan, 2011, 694. 
47 Op. cit., German, 2009, 344. 
48 Keith Johnson, “Energizing Europe.” Foreign Policy Magazine, 2 April, 2014, Accessed on April 22, 2014, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/04/02/energizing_europe . 
49 Ibid. 
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East, the Caspian region, the Caucasus, and the Balkans.50 This has led to a plethora of pipelines to be 
planned, including the South Stream pipeline, Nabucco and Nabucco-West, the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline 
(TAP), and the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP), which all pass through Turkey (with the exception 
off the South Stream pipeline). The geopolitical implications of Turkey as a key part of the future EU 
energy security strategy can therefore not be overstated, as it will hold in its safeguard a large portion of 
the continents energy supply routes. In addition, Turkey is also being considered as a transit country for a 
potential Israeli-Cypriot joint gas pipeline to Europe. Therefore no matter in which direction the EU 
chooses to expand its energy supply portfolio, Turkey is sure to gain from it, as the role it will have to 
play will elevate its status both at the EU level and at the global level. However, this also creates a 
situation in which once again the EU is entrusting a single actor with a large portion of the EU energy 
security responsibility, as it has done with Russia, which could become a dangerous proposition for the 
EU. Ozkan highlights the importance that Turkey could play in his analysis of the future potential of the 
Nabucco pipeline, while also stating that “if the project is realized, Turkey will be one of the key 
countries of the east-west corridor” in addition to playing a role in the development of a southern gas 
corridor.51 
 
4.2.7 – Qatar 
Qatar has established itself as a global LNG giant, by having become the world’s largest producer of 
LNG, which it sources from the North Field, one of the largest gas fields in the world.52 Qatar accounts 
for 11% of the EU’s gas supply53 due to its main form of gas export being LNG, for which there is not as 
big of an infrastructure present in Europe, as there is with conventional gas through pipelines. However, 
Qatar’s new export strategy is to increase LNG exports to Europe to account for a third of its LNG trade 
                                                
50 Op. cit., European Comission, 2008. 
51 Op. cit., Ozkan, 2011, 692. 
52 Op. cit., Hafner et al., 2008, 13. 
53 See figure 4.1.2.2 
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to create a potential of exporting 80 bcm/year of gas to Europe by 2030.54 Europe is also looking to 
develop its LNG import infrastructure in the future to create an alternative to conventional gas.55 While 
the development towards a much more significant energy partnership between Qatar and the EU will most 
likely not be seen this decade, the potential of Qatar as being a significant additional source to EU gas 
supply cannot be underestimated, especially with France, Italy, and the UK looking to develop new LNG 
re-gasification import terminals.56 
 
4.2.8 – Iran  
Iran has seen a positive development of its relations with the US and the EU as a result of the election of 
the new president, President Rouhani, as well as the fruitful discussions it had with regards to its nuclear 
energy program in November of 2013, which has led to the possible gradual lifting of sanctions. This has 
re-introduced Iran on the global diplomatic stage as being a state that is starting to cooperate again with 
the West. Consequently, the EU is therefore starting to consider it as a potential future gas supplier, as it 
has massive amounts of gas reserves in its South Pars gas field. While it is not expected for this gas 
relationship to still develop this decade, it has the potential to contribute to gas exports from the Middle 
East, which are at very minimal levels at the moment. What is interesting is the Memorandum of 
Understanding that Iran has signed to contribute gas to flow through TANAP in the future, indicating that 
while no definitive plans have been made between the EU and Iran, a structure for a future relationship 
between the two regions is being developed.57 
 
4.3 Possible strategies and regions of interest, and geopolitical implications of EU energy partnerships  
 
                                                
54 Op. cit., Hafner et al., 2008, 13. 
55 Op. cit., European Commission, 2008. 
56 Gonzalo Escribano Frances, "Market Or Geopolitics? the Europeanization of EU's Energy Corridors," International Journal of Energy 
Sector Management 5, no. 1 (2011). 
57 Op. cit., Ozkan, 2011, 694. 
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4.3.1 Regions 
4.3.1.1 – Levant Basin  
The Levant Basin58 is a region that has seen significant hydrocarbon reserve discoveries in the last 
decade, and it has thus become a region of interest to the EU as a potential addition to the EU gas supply 
portfolio. Looking at table 4.2.3.1 (p. 27), one can see the large number of fields that have been 
discovered in the region, particularly in Israel, and the pace at which they are being developed to be 
operational. Between Cyprus and Israel there are more than 40 tcf of gas that have been discovered at this 
point59, with the United States Geological Survey (USGS) estimating a total of 122 tcf of gas still being 
undiscovered in the Levant Basin.60 To put this into context, Russia, which holds the world’s largest 
natural gas reserves, has an estimated 250 tcm of gas reserves, which is roughly six times more than the 
potential of the Levant Basin, an area several times smaller than Russia.61 Given that EU gas consumption 
is at roughly 520 bcm62 at the moment, the Levant Basin has sufficient gas reserves to become a major 
gas supplier to the EU in the medium to long term63. The development of these fields, as well as the time 
it will take to do so, will determine the appropriateness of this region as a future gas supplier to the EU. 
However, this is a region with various disputes between neighbors that are rooted in the past, and these 
will need to be overcome in order to create partnerships and cooperation required to be able to exploit the 
newly found riches.  
 In early 2014, the Israeli High Court approved for up to 40% of its natural gas to be exported64, 
which opened up discussions for how to export these vast amounts of gas. Israel has a geostrategic 
problem of being a Jewish state in a predominantly Arabic-Islamic region, meaning that there are security 
                                                
58 Levant Basin is the waters between Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, and Cyprus. See figure 4.2.4.1 for a map of the region. 
59 US Energy Information Administration (US EIA), “Overview of oil and natural gas in the Eastern Mediterranean region,” August 2013, 
Retrieved on Feb. 19, 2014 from 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/Eastern_Mediterranean/eastern-mediterranean.pdf . 
60 Ibid. 
61 Op. Cit., Hafner et al., 2008, 8. 
62 Op. Cit., Jorg Doerler, A.T. Kearney, 2011. 
63 Medium term referring to within 10-20 years; Long term referring to within 20-35 years. 
64 Reuters, “Update 3 – Israel takes steps towards becoming a gas exporter” Reuters.com, February 7, 2014, accessed on Feb. 18, 2014 from  
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/07/woodside-leviathan-idUSL3N0LB5KU20140207 . 
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concerns in place over on-shore transportation of the gas through one of its neighbors due to past historic 
tensions.65 Thus a partnership with Cyprus has become an increasingly popular alternative to onshore 
transportation through pipelines, due to both states finding themselves in the similar positions of newly 
found hydrocarbon wealth. Various export routes have been explored, and at the moment there are two 
possibilities to get the gas to the EU market: one being through a pipeline that runs through Turkey, and 
the other option being a joint LNG terminal in Cyprus. Both options would see a cooperation of Cyprus 
and Israel, yet both also have significant issues to overcome before being realized. 
 A pipeline from Israel and Cyprus through Turkey would be the cheapest option, as it would cost 
roughly $2.5 billion versus the LNG terminal would could cost up to three times more,66 however there 
are geopolitical implications which would have to be considered first. The pipeline would originate from 
the Israeli Leviathan field, and from there it would pass through Cyprus’ EEZ to reach the Turkish port of 
Ceyhan (see figure 4.3.1.1). This route would allow the pipeline to avoid both Lebanon’s and Syria’s 
EEZ, where it is suggested that there would be frequent disruptions if the pipeline were to pass through 
them due to the political tensions between those two countries and Israel. However, the problem of 
building a pipeline through the middle of the Mediterranean without any close proximity to land is that 
the pipeline would have to be set relatively deep (about 2000 meters),67 meaning that there would be a 
considerably higher cost of construction than if it were to be built along a coastline, such as Cyprus’s. 
Therefore if both Turkey and Israel want to find a both realistic and economically viable route for the 
pipeline, it would have to both traverse Cyprus’ EEZ as well as probably be built near its coastline, if not 
have parts of it built onshore Cyprus. However, there is a diplomatic minefield that would have to be 
cleared before this is possible due to the historical tensions between Turkey and Cyprus.  
                                                
65 Michael J. Economides, “Eastern Mediterranean Energy: The Next Game.” Energy Tribune, June 5, 2012. Accessed on Feb. 21, 2014 from  
http://www.energytribune.com/11093/eastern-mediterranean-energy-the-next-game#sthash.Q4aJrKhQ.dpbs 
66 Natural Gas Europe, “Turkey and Israel May Reconcile After Years of Tension” April 4, 2014, Accessed April 12, 2014, 
http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/turkey-israel-may-reconcile-after-years-of-tension . 
67 Ibid. 
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 As Turkey does not recognize the Republic of Cyprus, due to tensions arising out of the legitimacy 
 of the government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), which no government in the 
world except for the Turkish government recognizes, it makes it difficult to establish amicable relations 
between the two states. This hostile diplomatic relation arose out of the division of the island in 1974 
when Turkish Cypriots claimed the north of the island and have since established a government there. 
This has created the geopolitical tension between the Turkey, the TRNC, and Cyprus which has created a 
stagnation in the development and exploration of the potential gas fields in Cyprus’ EEZ. Cyprus has said 
that it would not permit the construction of the pipeline through its EEZ until Turkey recognizes the 
existence of the Republic of Cyprus and makes an effort to resolve the conflict that has divided the island 
for the past 40 years.68 This creates the problem that there must be a resolution to the long running 
territorial dispute before a pipeline could even be built, which is creating a delay in the construction of it, 
                                                
68 Op. cit., Natural Gas Europe, April 4 2014. 
Figure 4.3.1.1 – Proposed path of Israeli-
Turkish pipeline (© Stratfor, 2014) 
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and thus also a delay in getting the gas to both the Turkish and the EU markets. However, it would also be 
in Cyprus’s interest to resolve this issue as its economic situation after the euro crisis has left it desperate 
for an economic jump-start, which this gas opportunity could provide, given the interest the EU has 
already expressed69 in having an partner in the Mediterranean region. While these tensions might exist, 
from a geopolitical perspective, the benefits of reconciliation between Cyprus and Turkey significantly 
outweigh the drawbacks primarily as it would help to advance the harmony in the region while erecting a 
strong multilateral energy partnership between Cyprus, Israel, and Turkey.  
 Reconciliation would not only permit the construction of the pipeline, and would thus give Israeli 
gas access to the EU market, but it would do the same for Cypriot gas. This is because a pipeline which 
runs near Cyprus’s coastline would make it easy for Cyprus to also feed it with gas from their 7 tcf 
Aphrodite field. Therefore Cyprus could also participate in the EU gas market without major investments 
of its own. Furthermore, although Cyprus has been considering the alternative of building a LNG terminal 
in its Vassilikos port, it has been having issues with both the financing of it as well as the justification for 
it in their current state. While the construction of it would free Cyprus from having to use Turkey as a 
route for its gas, it would not be able to justify the construction of it without the participation of Israel due 
to Cyprus not having sufficient recoverable gas reserves at the moment to rationalize the construction of a 
multibillion-dollar LNG terminal.70 The former Executive President of the Cyprus National Hydrocarbons 
Company, Mr. Charles Ellinas, commented that in order for the LNG terminal to be viable, Israel would 
have to participate with the gas from its Leviathan field, or otherwise Cyprus would have to wait to 
discover more hydrocarbon reserves in its EEZ to justify the construction of the terminal, a process which 
could delay the export of Cypriot gas to an EU market by several years.71 Therefore while the LNG 
terminal option might still be possible, it would not help Cyprus to export its gas within the next 5 years. 
                                                
69 Op. cit., European Commission, 2008. 
70 Karen Ayat, “Vassilikos LNG Terminal Construction Negotiations Reach Final Stages” August 12, 2013, accessed April 24, 2014, 
http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/cyprus-vassilikos-lng-terminal . 
71 Natural Gas Europe, “Cyprus’ Role in East Med: Plan A and Plan B” February 20, 2014, Accessed April 9, 2014. 
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 Lastly, through reconciliation of relationships between Cyprus and Turkey, Cyprus would 
potentially benefit from a Turkish project that is providing the TRNC what can be considered the most 
important resource in the world: water. In an effort to help the water-sparse Turkish side of Cyprus, 
Turkey is building an unprecedented 60-mile underwater water pipeline to meet the high demand of water 
in an area where there are constant shortages.72 A reunification of the two sides of Cyprus would therefore 
mean that there could be an exchange of resource, water for gas, which are two resources that both sides 
desperately need. This would therefore not be the first time that energy has encouraged reconciliation, as 
Dr. Furfari himself says “In Europe there is a record of peace and reconciliation through energy”.73 
 Turkey would also benefit from a normalization of relationships, as it suffers from the same plight 
as the EU of having a heavy dependence on Russia for its gas supplies.74 Turkey is tackling this through 
the construction of TANAP, and while the main suppliers of gas for this pipeline would be countries in 
the Caspian region, additional gas supplies from the Levant Basin would only help to reinforce the 
importance of this pipeline. Cypriot and Israeli gas, though a joint pipeline to Turkey, would therefore be 
able to reduce Turkish dependence on Russian gas while also further legitimizing a project that would 
establish an east-west corridor to give the EU access to gas from central Asia through Turkey. 
 Cyprus can therefore take a page from Israel’s diplomatic strategic efforts to reestablish foreign 
relations with Turkey, after a three-year hiatus which was the result of the 2010 Israeli raid on a flotilla 
bound for the Gaza strip that left 7 Turkish people dead.75 However, this reopening of diplomatic relations 
was brokered by the US, which does indicate the interest of the US to see an Israeli-Turkish pipeline 
being constructed.76 Perhaps this is due to US interests in diminishing Russian gas influence on this 
region while also empowering the efforts of EU gas diversification. What it does show is that the US is 
                                                
72 Associated Press, “Cyprus Water Project a Peace Pipeline to Some, a Turkish Trojan Horse to Others” February 28, 2014, Accessed on 
March 1, 2014, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2014/02/28/cyprus-water-project-peace-pipeline-to-some-turkish-trojan-horse-to-others/ . 
73 Op. cit., Dr. Samuele Furfari, April 10, 2014. 
74 Op. cit., Natural Gas Europe, April 4, 2014. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Karen Ayat, “The Likelihood of a Leviathan-Turkey Pipeline” Natural Gas Europe, February 27, 2014, accessed April 9, 2014, 
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invested in having an impact in the direction that energy policy goes in the region. Even though this is the 
case, neither the US nor the EU can prevent Russian influence in this region, seeing how Russia has close 
diplomatic relations with both Cyprus and Israel. As a result of this, Russian energy giant Gazprom was 
able to secure the exclusive rights to export and develop LNG from Israel’s Tamar field.77 This therefore 
means that Russia would still indirectly be influencing EU energy policy, even amid efforts to diversify 
their portfolio of gas suppliers. The fact that Gazprom became involved in this region, as well as in 
various other regions around the world validates Dr. Copinschi’s theory that Gazprom is trying to become 
a global player in order to defend their economic interests instead of just Russia’s political endeavors.78 
However, since Gazprom will only be involved with Leviathan he believes that “their involvement in 
Israel would not be a major focus for them”.79 While this might be true it does validate the fact that the 
EU will not be able to completely rid itself of Russian influence on its energy supply or its energy policy. 
Just as important is also the realization that the Levant Basin, although still a few years before it 
will be involved in the EU gas market, is a region which has drawn wide international interest to become 
a zone where multilateral agreements are needed in order to take advantage of the potential geopolitics of 
the region for the sake of future EU energy security. Furthermore, an EU energy partnership with this 
region would have various implications, as it would encourage the peace reconciliation process between 
Cyprus and Turkey, while also forging a multilateral partnership between Cyprus, Israel, and Turkey. In 
addition, the demand for gas which the EU market presents in the future, and the supply which this region 
could provide, would mean that the creation of TANAP would be even more essential in order to help 
diversify the EU gas supply portfolio. 
 
 
 
                                                
77 Op. cit., Keith Johnson, December 27, 2013. 
78 Op. cit., Dr. Philippe Copinshi, April 11, 2014. 
79 Ibid. 
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4.3.1.2 – Persian Gulf  
The EU has had a tumultuous relationship with the Persian Gulf80 and the Middle East in terms of being a 
supplier of energy, as it was the Middle East Crisis of the 1970s that initiated energy security concerns in 
the EU.81 Therefore turning back to this area as a supplier of both oil and gas is something that does not 
come without reservations as Dr. Furfari explains.82 Dr. Copinschi adds to this by saying that the EU 
energy policy “for the last 30 years has been mainly anything but the Persian Gulf”.83 This can be seen in 
that the largest contributor to the EU gas market from the Persian Gulf is Qatar, which currently 
contributes roughly 10% to the total EU gas imports, while African nations contribute a total of upwards 
of 20%.84 However, given the current state of EU energy security, this relationship could see a potential to 
return to its previous state, since the EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan outlines efforts to be 
made for the “Development of a Southern Gas Corridor for supply from Caspian and Middle Eastern 
sources and possibly other countries in the longer term, improving security of supply”.85 As Qatar is 
considered to be a world leader in terms of LNG production, an EU move towards the Persian Gulf would 
fulfill what Dr. Furfari considers to be two vital components for a general strategy of the EU energy 
policy, which are i) a diversification of energy sources, and ii) a diversification of origins of energy.86 
 The Persian Gulf collectively accounts for about 40% of global proved natural gas reserves, which 
includes the world’s largest non-associated gas field, the Qatari North Field.87 This makes it a key region 
in energy geopolitics and a very serious contender for the EU’s future gas supplier portfolio. What is 
interesting about this region is that it focuses primarily on LNG as a form of gas export instead of on 
pipelines. An energy partnership between the EU and the Persian Gulf would therefore help to accelerate 
the EU’s ambitions to increase its use of LNG as alternative gas form. Looking at figure 4.3.1.2.1, one 
                                                
80 The Persian Gulf consists of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. 
81 Mr. Marc Finaud, Senior Program Advisor, Emerging Security Challenges Program. Geneva Center for Security Policy (GCSP), Interview 
by Gabriel Uribe, 14 April 2014, United Nations Offices in Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland. 
82 Op. cit., Dr. Samuele Furfari, April 10, 2014. 
83 Op. cit., Dr. Philippe Copinschi, April 11, 2014. 
84 See figure 4.1.2.2 (p. 20). 
85 Op. cit., European Comission, 2008. 
86 Op. cit., Dr. Samuele Furfari, April 10, 2014. 
87 Op. cit., Hafner et al., 2008. 
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can see the projects planned for the expansion of LNG terminals in various countries, indicating an 
expected increase in production. This can be related to both the increase in gas demand that can be seen in 
the future for both the EU and the Asian gas market. 
 
The EU demand for gas has led two countries to take leadership in gas productions and exports in the 
Persian Gulf: Iran and Qatar. This potential in LNG exports from both countries to the EU has led to a 
potential in the broadening of energy infrastructure in the EU to be able to cope with a future increase in 
demand of LNG.88 From a security policy perspective, Dr. Biscop, who specializes in the area of EU 
foreign policy and EU security policy, believes that the “GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council)-EU relation is 
handicapped”89,90, and therefore an energy partnership could help to strengthen this relationship.  Current 
LNG imports to the EU are at around 80 bcm of gas, and this number is expected to double by 2020, 
meaning that there needs to be a push for LNG infrastructure construction in the EU as current 
                                                
88 Dr. Christian Koch, Director, Gulf Research Center Foundation (GRCF), Interview by Gabriel Uribe, 9 April, 2014, Gulf Research Center 
Foundation Offices, Geneva, Switzerland. 
89 Op. cit., Dr. Sven Biscop, April 11, 2014. 
90 The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) consists of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. 
Figure 4.3.1.2.1 – LNG plants and projects in 
Persian Gulf countries (© OME, 2011) 
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infrastructure would not be able to support it.91 However, as could be seen with the case of Cyprus, LNG 
infrastructure is significantly more expensive than a gas-pipeline infrastructure. The benefit of LNG is 
that it is far more flexible than gas pipelines in terms of where the gas is sourced from, which would give 
the EU flexibility in terms of energy diversification without having to commit to any source in the long-
term. 
 
To be able to cope with this increased supply, several LNG gasification terminals are being planned in the 
EU: two in Italy, two in Spain, one in France, one in Brussels, and two more in the UK.92 While the 
development of this entire infrastructure will take time to build, making LNG more of a medium to long-
term plan in the EU’s energy development, it will bring flexibility to the EU gas supply portfolio beyond 
just the Persian Gulf. 
                                                
91 Op. cit., Jorg Doerler et al., A.T. Kearney, 2011. 
92 Op. cit., Hafner et al., 2008, 17. 
Figure 4.3.1.2.2 – EU current and future gas import capacity versus 
demand (© A.T. Kearney, 2011) 
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 A further crucial geopolitical implication of an EU energy partnership with the Persian Gulf is that 
Iran would start to again play an important role in EU energy policy. Due to the impetus in Iranian foreign 
relations with both the US and the EU in the past year, the EU can start looking at Iran as a future energy 
partner. However, the problem with Iran as an energy partner is that “Iranian competition will not happen 
in short term, but rather in long-term, due to a requirement of progress and sanction reliefs before Iran 
would export significant amounts of gas to EU market”93, meaning that Iran would not be a solution to the 
issue of EU over-dependence on Russian gas. Rather, it could be seen as a significant gas supplier to the 
EU market within 10 to 15 years. 
 Lastly, a major potential development of an energy partnership between the EU and the Persian 
Gulf would be an exchange of technological resources for the development of Renewable Energy Sources 
(RES). RES account for about 10% of the EU energy mix94, with the EU energy policy aiming to increase 
this share to 20% by 2020.95 Dr. Koch, who is the Director of the Gulf Research Center Foundation in 
Geneva, theorizes that with the Persian Gulf’s desire to be less dependent on its own supplies of natural 
energy resources comes the aspiration for an increase in RES development as an alternative to fossil 
fuels.96 This is a field in which the EU has made major advances, yet it is not as significant as fossil fuels 
in the total energy mix. An energy partnership that develops out of oil and gas imports to the EU from the 
Persian Gulf could therefore develop into one of an exchange of technological know-how of RES. While 
this would be much more of a long-term relationship, it does encourage an energy relationship to be 
developed in the short to medium-term to be able to segue into this long-term relationship between the EU 
and the Persian Gulf. 
 The geopolitical implications of a relationship between these two regions are therefore 
multifaceted. It would push for an adoption of LNG in the EU market, which would lead to an increased 
                                                
93 Op. cit., Dr. Christian Koch, April 9, 2014. 
94 See figure 4.1.2.3 (p. 21). 
95 Op. cit., European Commission, 2008 
96 Op. cit., Dr. Christian Koch, April 9, 2014. 
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flexibility in terms of energy sources due to LNG not being bound to the same source of origin 
restrictions as pipelines. Furthermore, in the medium to long-term, the EU would have a strong energy 
partner with significant quantities of gas, which would help to diminish reliance on Russian gas. Likewise 
there would be an improvement in relations with Iran, which has the added benefit of brining harmony to 
the region due to economic ties trumping political or ideological disputes, as has been suggested through 
the theory of economic interdependence leading to peace – the perfect example of which would be the EU 
itself. Consequently, the EU would also create a more stable neighborly region for Europe. Lastly, such a 
relationship would have the benefit of being one that goes beyond just natural energy resources, but also 
has the potential of being one which includes the exchange of RES technology, a further economic 
benefit. 
  
4.3.1.3 – The Pipelines: The Balkan and Caspian regions 
While both the Levant Basin and the Persian Gulf fulfill the requisites to be potential additions to the EU 
gas supply portfolio, the earliest time significant quantities of gas from these regions would reach the EU 
market, or in the case of Qatar an increase in supply of LNG, would be at the end this decade due to the 
requirement for both the planning of infrastructure in some cases, or the construction of it in others.97 
However, a third potential region for the EU to explore as an addition to its gas supplier portfolio would 
be central Asia, specifically the Caspian region. There, in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, 
largely untapped gas fields have the potential of creating an east-west gas corridor between them and 
Europe. In order for the EU to be able to gain access to this region without Russian influence, a system of 
pipelines must be in place. This is because existing pipelines from the to the EU pass through Russia, 
which would defeat the purpose of an emphasis on a reduction of Russian influence on EU gas supply. 
Four pipelines, which are either in the process of being constructed, or have been approved for 
                                                
97 Mert Bilgin, "Geo-Economics of European Gas Security: Trade, Geography and International Politics" Insight Turkey 12, no. 4 (2010), 
accessed April 16, 2014, http://search.proquest.com/docview/763263520?accountid=11243 . 
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construction, will help to create the east-west corridor: TAP, TANAP, and Nabucco, as well as the South 
Stream pipeline which is considered the Russian competition to the EU-backed Nabucco. 
 The size of gas reserves in the Caspian region are quite vast, however due to their geographical 
situation, their gas system, which was designed in the Soviet era, had been designed to supply Russia.98 
Consequently the countries in this region had been depending on Russia for gas exports to Europe.99 The 
purpose of these pipelines is therefore for the EU to have a direct access to these vast gas reserves without 
having Russia as a middleman. Azerbaijan is forecast to annually produce between 30 and 70 bcm of gas 
by 2020, with this number expected to stabilize by 2030.100 In Turkmenistan there is a high chance of 
additional gas fields being found, which means that the current annual production figure of around 50 
bcm of gas is expected to increase to 120 bcm of gas.101 Similarly to Turkmenistan, there are also 
expectations of further gas discoveries in Kazakhstan, with estimates of gas production increasing three 
fold from its current levels of around 30 bcm to more than 90 bcm by 2030.102 The Caspian region 
therefore shows promise in being a region with sufficient quantities of gas for the amount of capital that is 
being invested in its infrastructure, as each pipeline costs upwards of $4 billion USD.103  
 The various pipelines that have been proposed and are being constructed to connect the Caspian 
region as well as the Middle East with Europe overlap each other and therefore some projects are 
redundant. However, these pipelines not only represent a competition of trying to reach the EU gas market 
first, but also a struggle for the EU to be able to further distance itself from Russian influence over EU gas 
supply.104 Figure 4.3.1.3.1105 shows the routes that TANAP, TAP, and Nabucco (Nabucco West) will 
                                                
98 Op. cit., Hafner et al., 2008, 10. 
99 Ibid, 10. 
100 Ibid, 10. 
101 Ibid, 11. 
102 Ibid, 11.  
103 Dominique Finon, “The EU Foreign Gas Policy of Transit Corridors: Autopsy of the Stillborn Nabucco Project” OPEC Energy Review 
35, no. 1 (March, 2011), Accessed April 12, 2014, DOI:10.1111/j.1753-0237.2010.00185.x . 
104 Ibid. 
105 Caitlin Del Sole, “Azerbaijan choses TAP over Nabucco to provide gas pipeline to Europe” The European Institute, August, 2013, 
accessed April 26, 2014. http://www.europeaninstitute.org/August-2013/azerbaijan-chooses-tap-over-nabucco-to-provide-gas-pipeline-to-
europe-88.html . 
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take. This network of pipelines will not only help to establish the east-west corridor, but it also has the 
advantage of having two separate entries to Europe, ensuring a constant supply if the other path 
experiences temporary disruptions.  
 
 
Nabucco was originally planned to be the combination of TANAP and Nabucco West, however due to 
both the competition of the South Stream pipeline, and the expansion of the South Caucasus Pipeline, the 
decision was made to shorten Nabucco to Nabucco West to make it more economically attractive, while 
also ensuring the construction of a pipeline through Turkey.106 Russia knows of the EU’s efforts to reduce 
dependence on Russian gas, and thus to ensure that it would not lose its footing in the EU market, it 
proposed the construction of the South Stream pipeline. This pipeline, which can be seen in figure 
4.3.1.3.2107, would also provide gas to southern Europe, and like the original Nabucco pipeline, it would 
also feed Europe through two different routes. However, there are two key difference between the two 
competing projects: South Stream would provide the EU with Russian gas, instead of Caspian gas, and 
would thus increase EU dependence on Russian gas, and secondly it would not pass through Turkey. 
                                                
106 Op. cit., Finon, 2011. 
107 Eke, Steven. “Russia signs gas pipeline deals.” BBC. May 15, 2009. Accessed April 29, 2014. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8051921.stm . 
 
Figure 4.3.1.3.1 – Southern Corridor gas network, excluding the South 
Stream pipeline. (© The European Institute, 2013) 
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The survival of Nabucco-West depended on Azerbaijani supplies of gas from the Shah Deniz gas field, 
and when in July 2013, the Shah Deniz Consortium made the decision to export its gas through TAP 
instead of through Nabucco-West, any reason for its existence disappeared, as there would not be 
sufficient gas supplies to feed Nabucco-West.108 Therefore construction on Nabucco-West is still on hold, 
while the construction of the South Stream pipeline will go ahead as planned. While this represents a 
significant defeat in efforts for the EU to increase its energy security, it only delays EU efforts at 
increasing its energy security, instead of defeating them. This is because TANAP and TAP are still going 
to be constructed, meaning that avenues for the EU to have access to Caspian gas will exist in the future. 
This will therefore bridge these two regions by using Turkey as a middleman instead of Russia. Therefore 
even though Nabucco failed, Turkey still ends up becoming a key geostrategic partner of the EU, which 
Ozkan argues will help elevate Turkey’s status in the eyes of the EU.109 TANAP will therefore most 
likely not only become an access point to the EU gas market for Caspian gas, but also for the Middle East, 
and the Levant Basin. Since Israel and Cyprus might be exporting their gas to the EU market through 
Turkey, their gas would most likely pass through TANAP and then through TAP before reaching Europe. 
This will most likely also become the case for Middle Eastern countries exporting gas to the EU market. 
Iran also presents an interesting case, as although there are currently no firm plans for Iran to supply 
                                                
108 Chazan, Guy and Shotter, James, “TAP clinches Azeri gas pipeline deal” The Financial Times, June 26, 2013, accessed April 26, 2014,  
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/41a3c048-de4f-11e2-b990-00144feab7de.html#axzz30lwjsDOo . 
109 Op. cit., Ozkan, 2011, 697. 
Figure 4.3.1.3.2 – Competing South Stream and 
Nabucco pipelines (©BBC, 2009). 
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significant amounts of gas to the EU market, Iran signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Turkey 
in 2008 in which it was agreed that Iran would supply Turkey with gas through a 2,000 km pipeline from 
Iran to Turkey’s border.110 This would therefore make it easy for Iran to supply gas to the EU, using 
Turkey as a segue, if an agreement is reached in which Iran would become an EU gas supplier. 
 Furthermore, another country that emerges victorious out of these pipeline wars is Greece. The 
EU-member country, which was severely affected by the euro crisis, will most likely see economic 
benefits as a result of being a transit country for TAP. This pipeline will also help to increase regional 
energy security, as it will become a major inter-European gas route. The geopolitical implications of the 
gas pipeline wars cannot be overstated. While Russia secured a victory with the South Stream pipeline, 
the combination of TAP and TANAP will encourage the development of a permanent multifaceted gas 
network that circumvents Russia, and will thus help to reduce EU dependence on Russian gas. It will 
become a crucial pillar for the EU’s future energy security while supporting a vast energy diversification 
effort of the current EU gas supplier portfolio that extends into the Caspian, the Middle East, and the 
Levant Basin. What can therefore ultimately be observed in the future is Turkey potentially rivaling 
Russia as a major energy gateway to Europe. 
 
4.4 Potential future scenarios  
  
4.4.1 Short-term (2014-2020) 
In the short-term, the EU has no choice but to continue its energy relationship with Russia as none of the 
alternatives discussed in this paper would be ready for at least another three years. When it comes to 
energy supply security, Fujishima theorizes that in the short-term, strategies focus on economic efficiency 
rather than on ensuring energy security, as there is a priority on being able to satisfy the demand for 
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gas.111 It can be seen that the EU is following this theory due to the vital role that gas plays in the EU 
energy mix. A sudden drop in EU imports of Russian gas should therefore not be expected in the short-
term due to the existing EU economic dependence on it. 
 What can however be expected is a rapid development in alternatives to Russian gas. Therefore 
the EU will most likely put pressure on the construction and development of TAP and TANAP, while also 
improving its relations with Turkey. The geopolitical importance of Turkey for the EU’s energy security 
policy cannot be emphasized enough, and therefore with regard to the EU’s behavior towards Turkey it 
would not be surprising if both the EU and the US would start to support Turkish foreign ambitions in the 
near future. The US would also have an interest in supporting the construction of these pipelines, as it 
would give them influence over a key energy market. 
 It should therefore also be expected that both the EU and the US would support and also aid 
efforts to reunite Cyprus in order for the EU to gain access to the Cypriot and Israeli gas fields through a 
pipeline to Turkey. While significant amounts of gas from either of these two countries will most likely 
only start flowing to the EU in the medium-term, serious efforts at reconciliation between Turkey and 
Cyprus should be expected in the short term. US involvement in this conflict would only serve to increase 
their influence in the regions’ energy development, and therefore the US is playing a purely geopolitical 
game, while the EU is playing it with the intended purpose of securing its energy needs in the future. 
 While it may not occur until 2017, the US could also very likely start supplying the EU gas market 
with shale oil, as was stated by US Secretary of State John Kerry as an assurance against Russian gas 
supplies.112 While this can be interpreted as being more than anything a friendly diplomatic gesture, 
almost suggesting a resurgence of the cold-war era relationship between the EU and the US, these 
supplies of shale oil would most likely be insignificant in the short-run. 
   
                                                
111 Op. cit., Fujishima, 2009. 
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4.4.2 Medium-term (2020-2030) 
In the medium-term the EU energy security policy that has been set in motion in the last couple of years 
can be seen materializing into a functioning system of gas pipelines, LNG terminals and numerous 
additions to the EU gas supplier portfolio. To start off, it would not be unreasonable to assume that given 
EU and US support for a Cypriot reunification, that Cyprus will reunify in this decade. If that were the 
case, then it would also be reasonable to assume that the Cypriot-Israeli-Turkish pipeline would have been 
built, thus creating a strategic energy partnership between the EU and the Levant Basin. In addition, given 
the likelihood of further gas discoveries in the Levant Basin, in both Israel’s and Cyprus’s EEZ, the LNG 
port that Cyprus is planning to build will most likely have also been built to give this region a flexibility 
in the export options of its gas. However, even though the Levant Basin would contribute to the EU gas 
supply, Dr. Copinschi believes that this region, as well as a future US supply of gas, would only be a 
“brick in the wall”, meaning that they would not represent an overwhelming part of the total of EU gas 
imports.113 
 However, this could be considered progress as the EU is not over-relying on a single gas supplier, 
which would lead it to the political tensions that it is experiencing with Russia at the moment. Rather it 
would be both diversifying its suppliers and its forms of gas, as both A.T. Kearney, and the report by the 
OME predict that LNG will play a much more significant role in the EU energy mix in the next decade. 
Figure 4.4.2114 is a map that depicts ongoing as well as future gas corridor developments in and to Europe, 
and it can be observed that there are expected to be several new LNG gasification terminals in the EU, as 
well as several new gas pipelines creating an east-west corridor between the EU and the Middle East, 
Levant Basin, and Caspian region. With these new LNG terminals, Qatar will most likely have started to 
significantly increase their export of LNG to the EU, which would help to forge a stronger energy 
relationship between the EU and the Persian Gulf. As the rekindling of relations between Iran and the EU 
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has only been a development of foreign relations over the past few months, it would be too early to be 
able to firmly determine at what point the EU can expect to see significant imports of Iranian gas. 
Regardless of the expected time period for this energy relationship development, according to Dr. Koch it 
is expected to happen, especially since Germany already has relatively close ties to Iran.115 
 
Yet perhaps the most prominent development in European geopolitical energy landscape is the maturity of 
Turkey as a significant regional energy power. By the next decade, if a significant east-west corridor has 
been established, then Turkey would essentially become a gatekeeper to the EU for these new gas 
suppliers. It would therefore be rivaling Russia as an energy port to Europe. While this means that the EU 
will have successfully achieved a diversification in its gas suppliers, it would also mean that once again 
the EU would be significantly dependent on another country for its energy sources. Although the EU 
                                                
115 Op. cit., Dr. Christian Koch, April 9, 2014. 
Figure 4.4.2 – Ongoing and future gas corridor developments to 
Europe. (©OME, 2008) 
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would definitely still maintain Russia as an energy supplier, which would create a competitive 
environment between Turkey and Russia in terms of ‘gatekeepers’ to the EU gas market, this scenario still 
creates a security concern for the EU. This is because an unstable Turkey could lead to significant energy 
disruptions for the EU. Therefore part of the EU’s energy security policy would have to be an interest and 
active pursuit of a politically and physically stable and secure Turkey. 
  
4.4.3 Long-term (2030-2050) 
The long-term energy security outlook for the EU is still open for debate, as the EU would most likely 
still rely quite significantly on fossil fuels, and therefore it would depend on its oil and gas suppliers for a 
stable economy. By this point it would be safe to assume that a shift in the share of gas supplied by EU 
energy partners will have occurred. Russia will still be a significant partner, and while the goal of the 
current EU energy security and energy diversification policies is to diminish reliance on Russian gas, it is 
not to abandon it either as Russia has too important of a geostrategic advantage in the EU gas supply 
market for the EU to simply abandon this relationship. Rather, it can be expected that the Russian share in 
EU gas supply will have dropped from 33% in 2011 to roughly 20% - 25% by 2030, as indicated by 
figure 4.4.3.1116 This map which projects future gas supplies to Europe also illustrates the importance that 
the east-west corridor will play in diminishing Russian gas supply dominance.  
 The importance of the Middle East as a potential future player in the EU energy supply market in 
the long-term is key to also developing a transition from natural energy resources dominated energy mix 
to one more focused on RES. By 2050, the EU has set a goal to significantly diminish its impact on the 
environment, as well as its consumption of fossil fuels. A shift towards RES will help it achieve this goal, 
however this would have to be accompanied by a phase-out plan of a reliance on external sources for its 
energy. What the EU could therefore do, as DR. Koch suggested will happen between the EU and Persian 
Gulf, is a reciprocal energy relationship. This would mean that there would a reverse flow in energy 
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between the EU and its former suppliers. It would therefore supply these energy partners with 
technological know-how on the development of RES. While RES is not a geostrategic type of energy, as 
it can be set up in most parts of the world regardless of location, this reversal of relationship would help 
the EU to maintain economic relationships with its former energy suppliers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While this is a possible scenario, various events can occur within the next 30 years that would nullify this 
theory. However, returning to the original concerns of EU energy security, figure 4.4.3.2117 indicates the 
future potential gas production numbers for various regions of interest to the EU. Looking at the table, the 
observation can be made that while the EU would certainly have to make decisions on who to embrace as 
an energy partner in the interests of energy security, there will certainly be plentiful supplies of gas to 
ensure that the EU economy can prosper without the concern of running out of essential natural resources 
before RES have been sufficiently evolved to allow a relaxation of dependency on natural gas. 
                                                
117 Ibid, 14. 
Figure 4.4.3.1 – Gas export potential to Europe from 
neighboring natural gas producing regions. (©OME, 
2008). 
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5. Conclusion  
The energy policy of the EU is a central pillar of the community that not only supports the EU economy, 
but also the security of the Union. It is for this reason that it is so crucial for the EU to develop 
mechanisms to protect it from being dominated by an oligopoly of energy suppliers while also keeping in 
mind the importance of having a balanced energy consumption mix as well as a balanced energy supplier 
portfolio. Various scenarios could play out in the coming future when it comes to the development of the 
EU energy policy, however certain forthcoming trends can be identified to be impacting the regional 
energy geopolitics. 
 Most importantly, it is important to realize that despite its best efforts, the EU will never be able to 
completely rid itself of Russian influence on its energy security or energy supply. It might be able to 
reduce direct influence, but indirect influence will always be present due to Gazprom’s involvement in 
Figure 4.4.3.2 – Gas supply potential to Europe by exporting 
country and region, projections through 2030. (© OME, 2008) 
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various regions, such as in Israel’s Leviathan field. Furthermore, another crucial trend that can be 
identified is the rising importance of Turkey as a strategic partner for the EU as it will act as a 
‘gatekeeper’ to the EU energy market, similarly to the role that Russia has had over the last few decades. 
However, Turkey would not have the same degree of influence on its neighbors’ energy supply as Russia 
has, as it would act as a middleman, instead of as a supplier. In order for the EU to gain access to the 
Middle East, Persian Gulf, Levant Basin, or Caspian regions, without using Russia as an access point, the 
EU will have to make Turkey a strategic priority as it will play the vital role of becoming a major energy 
port to Europe. 
 A further trend that can be identified is both the development of a southern energy corridor to the 
Middle East and Persian Gulf, as well as an east-west energy corridor to the Caspian. These are two 
crucial energy regions that the EU will most likely embrace in order to expand its energy supplier 
portfolio. A consequence of the development of this corridor would be a renewal in energy relationships 
between the EU and Iran, as the Turkish access point would allow for an energy partnership to develop. 
This partnership would however not be possible without the support of the US, which would be another 
identifiable trend in the future development of the EU energy policy. This is because the successful 
execution of an energy policy focused on energy security and diversification would require a multilateral 
approach towards a reform of energy partnerships. If the US wants to maintain a status of being a world 
hegemonic power, it must influence world energy relationships and dependencies. It therefore follows that 
the US would also get involved in the EU energy policy. 
 Lastly, a likely trend that can be observed as a consequence of the EU energy policy is that there 
will be an increase in the reliance of LNG as an alternative to pipeline gas. This is because of the 
flexibility offered by LNG to not be tied to a single supplier. An initial energy partnership with Qatar will 
help to push this adoption towards LNG, but it will not remain exclusive to Qatar as a supplier of LNG. 
 The EU energy policy is something which is at the heart of the development of the Union, 
however due to existing geopolitical energy relations, it is not easy to adopt a new policy within a few 
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months or even one or two years, as Dr. Furfari explains: “Change will not come easily as it will take tens 
of years to change the track of the EU energy policy. This is because it will take space, time, and capital 
to develop this energy policy”.118 
  
                                                
118 Op. cit., Dr. Samuele Furfari, April 10, 2014. 
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